Scope “Prevention of critical infrastructure”

The early warning is essential for protection of critical infrastructures. We focus on developing sensors for early warning, giving information about the intruder or group entering the protected perimeter long before the threat has reached fencing or the very purpose of the crime.

RESEARCH TASKS

The development of new concepts for employment of anti-terrorist forces inevitably places certain up-to-date requirements to the system of barriers to prevent threats against various types of infrastructure objects.

The implementation of high-tech equipment is particularly important for success. The rapid deployment forces should be enabled to receive information in real time in order to have full control on the movement of the potential violator. The effective areas should be saturated with sensors which assist for the realization of continuous control over the protected objects.

The anti-terrorist forces have definite superiority in determination of the potential threat and the scale of reaction. In order to preserve that superiority, they should be able to receive continuous information about the intentions of the violator and to engage him incessantly from the very beginning.

The realization of continuous remote control enables to control the system rapidly and to benefit from the favorable situation created immediately and without awaiting a preset programmed time, which is very difficult to be determined accurately for the concrete operation.

The growing urbanization makes ever greater the probability for anti-terrorist forces to operate in urban environment. The anti-terrorist defense in urban conditions imposes specific requirements to the means for prevention. The underground transportation systems and public services, staircase cells of the buildings, foyers, passages and roofs of the buildings can be secured and watched by the alternative means of prevention.

The anti-terrorist forces of Republic of Bulgaria engaged in operations out of the frames of item 5 of the Washington Contract also require systems for prevention. In such operations the systems for prevention are necessary for protection of the deployed forces and the critical infrastructure. Governmental buildings, radio and television stations, business centers, centers for food distribution, police stations, logistic bases and refugee camps in certain cases are the examples for places, which may need alternative preventive systems which should guarantee mainly the controlled access to the objects or restriction of the approaches to them.

The main features of the System are as follows: ability for operation in 24-hours mode, automatic warning, frustration of intrusions through autonomous impact devices and subdivided security area. It is necessary to arrange sensors for warning about intruder’s invasion within the security area, which will also provide the information needed for autonomous operation of non-lethal means. On activation of the sensors, a signal is transmitted to the radar for tracking the intruder. The radar localizes the target and ensures additional means for non-lethal impact. The target is identified through wide-angle cameras (night and day) and specialized software for identification of faces.

On the other hand, the prevention of the terrorist threat includes also providing a possibility to receive on-time, reliable and quality information from the critical object for its technical condition, residual life-time, reliability and safety. This information, together with the information from the system for prevention of potential violations, shall enable the persons in charge to take proper decision in critical situation, in conditions of time shortage and multi-choice of decisions.

The following tasks are to be accomplished:
1. Fundamental investigations for development of means of non-lethal impact.
2. Elaboration of model systems for protection of different types of critical infrastructure.
3. Carrying out interdisciplinary fundamental researches related to assessment of the technical condition, residual life-time, reliability and safety of the critical infrastructure.

Main key objects

  • First loop components of Kozloduy NPP, such as reactor pressure vessels, steam generators and pipelines in operational and after-operational period;
  • First loop components of Belene NPP, such as reactor pressure vessels, steam generators and pipelines in before-operational period; metal building constructions;
  • Risk equipment operating in high-pressure, high-temperature and aggressive environment in the heavy chemistry and metallurgy;
  • Gas pipelines;
  • Transportation vehicles.

Risk factors

The main risk factor for destruction of installations and constructions is their ageing. In case of non-regulated human interference against the integrity of these installations, the ageing extremely eases the destruction.

Ageing results from a number of chemical and physical processes caused by the presence of:

  • Mechanical stresses;
  • Deformations;
  • High temperatures;
  • High pressure;
  • Aggressive environment;
  • Neutron irradiation.

Under the influence of the said factors, the materials of the critical infrastructure components gradually decrease their functional properties during exploitation. The probability for destruction of certain installation components grows with ageing and the degree of safety decreases. That can help the terrorists to select the targets and to localize the impact during planning their attacks, thus facilitating them in achieving their tasks.

ANTICIPATED EFFECTS AND RESULTS

In the scope of “Prevention of the critical infrastructure” the following effects and results are to be achieved:
1. Providing conditions for investigation, location, management and control of the reasons for material destruction in various exploitation conditions of particular technological objects.
2. Providing:

  • Possibility to assess the effectiveness of the examined materials, their exploitation fitness and resistance to external influences.
  • Conditions for defining many qualitative and quantitative relationships between the structure and service properties and adding to the data base of materials.
  • Development of more precise criteria for the exploitation fitness of the materials and products.
  • Improvement of the methods for assessment and control of risky installations.
  • Improvement of the methods for assessment of the residual life-time of the critical infrastructures.
  • Possibility to develop new materials of better set of physical-mechanical properties and higher resistance to external influences.
  • Development of systems for prevention of potential threats against strategic object on the territory of the country.